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Abstract
This paper estimates the causal impact of compulsory military service on men in 
Germany using social security and pension administrative data for the cohort of 
individuals born in the period 1932–1942. Due to the combination of laws restrict-
ing conscription only to men born on or after July 1, 1937, diﬀ  erence-in-diﬀ  erences 
estimates of the eﬀ  ect of conscription on average daily wages can be computed using 
cohorts of women as a comparison group. The results indicate that conscription had 
no signiﬁ  cant impact on a draftee’s labor-market performance, validating an earlier 
result using an alternative identiﬁ  cation strategy.
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Germany is among the dwindling number of countries, especially in Europe, that still use conscrip-
tion to staff its armed forces. Most recently, Sweden abolished compulsory military servcie (CMS) af-
ter 109 years of obligating young men (and, since 1980, young women) to serve in the armed forces.1
Various other countries are seriously considering a transition to an all-volunteer force. In Germany,
the issue of ending conscription has recently been raised by the Defense Minister, Karl-Theodor zu
Guttenberg, who irked some of his colleagues by going against his party’s long-standing support for
obligatory military service (Wehrdienst).2 The reason is more economic than strategic. Faced with a
tightening ﬁscal constraint brought on by the economic and ﬁnancial crisis that started in 2007, the
German federal government is becoming increasingly creative in ensuring ﬁscal balance. According
tooneestimate, thegovernmentwillsavealmoste500millionperyearbyabolishingconscription—
not a small amount of money considering that it wants to save e80 billion by 2014.3 The potential
annual savings from conscription represents about 1.6 percent of total military expenditure in 2008
(e31.921 billion).4
Surprisingly, however, there is a dearth of studies looking at the impact of military service, com-
pulsory or otherwise, on the people who actually serve or have served in Germany. While the issue
has been examined in the United States in a series of papers by Joshua Angrist, the pecuniary and
non-pecuniaryimpactsofhavingbeeninthearmedforceshavelargelybeenneglectedinGermany.5
This problem is made more acute in the context of the reform currently being contemplated by the
Defense Minister. For such a major transformation of a country’s armed forces and defense strategy,
it becomes imperative to reach well-informed conclusions founded on credible policy evaluation.
Thus, one aim of the present study is to provide additional evidence on the effects of military service
1Agence France-Presse, “Sweden ends compulsory military service”, Defense News, 1 July 2010. Accessed 6 August
2010. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4694162.
2Fröhlingsdorf, Michael, Sven Röbel, and Christoph Scheuermann, “Killing time: for conscripts, German military
service is a battle against boredom”, Der Spiegel, 24 June 2010. Accessed 6 August 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/
international/germany/0,1518,702665,00.html. See also Demmer, Ulrike, Kerstin Kullmann, René Pﬁster, and
ChristophSchwennicke, “Dodgingthedraft: conscriptiondebatedividesGermanconservatives”, DerSpiegel, 29July2010.
Accessed 6 August 2010. http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,708905,00.html.
3Joyner, James, “Germany can’t afford military conscription”, Atlantic Council, 29 July 2010. Accessed 6 August 2010.
http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/germany-cant-afford-military-conscription. See also “Radical cut-
backs: German government agrees on historic austerity program”, Der Spiegel, 7 June 2010. Accessed 6 August 2010.
http://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/0,1518,699229,00.html.
4Military expenditure was obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.
5For the US, see Angrist [1990], Angrist [1993], Angrist and Krueger [1994], Angrist and Chen [2008], and Angrist, Chen
and Frandsen [2009], all of which give a modern econometric treatment to the issue. For Germany, see Schleicher [1996]
andSchäfer[2000]. Thesestudies, however, focusontheimplicittaxthatisimposedonconscriptsduringtheperformance
of their civic duty. An exception is a previous paper by the current authors; see Bauer et al. [2009].
4to guide policymakers not only in Germany but also in those countries contemplating changes to the
way their armed forces are organized.
Varying results have been reported by researchers in different jurisdictions. For example, for
those who actually served in wars, Angrist [1990] shows that Vietnam War veterans earned approxi-
mately 15 percent lower annual wages than non-veterans although updated estimates from Angrist
and Chen [2008] ﬁnd no long-term impacts. Furthermore, Angrist and Krueger [1994] indicate no ef-
fect of serving in World War II on the labor-market performance of veterans. There are also estimates
for national military service that does not involve serving in war zones. On one hand, Imbens and
van der Klaauw [1995] show that conscripts in the Netherlands earn about 5 percent less than those
who did not perform military service. On the other hand, an earlier paper by the current authors
[Bauer et al. 2009] ﬁnd no similar effect for conscripts in Germany. While Buonanno [2006] ﬁnds a
small penalty for conscripts in the UK, Grenet, Hart and Roberts [2010] report no signiﬁcant effects
for the same country. Other outcome variables of interest, such as demand for education, have also
been examined. Card and Lemieux [2001] and Maurin and Xenogiani [2007] ﬁnd evidence that col-
lege enrollment increases as a result of men avoiding the draft in the US and France, respectively.
This is because men enrolled in university are temporarily exempted from conscription. Cipollone
and Rosolia [2007], however, ﬁnd that exemption from military service raised boys’ high school grad-
uation rates in Italy (i.e., it would have been lower had the draft applied to these boys).
In a sense, conscripts were being made to pay a tax-in-kind to the State; this fact is well-known.
However, one should also note that time spent in the German armed forces Bundeswehr equates to
time not spent in the civilian labor market, where they could accumulate human capital or earn in-
come. Moreover,thehumancapitalthatconscriptshaveaccumulateduptothepointofconscription
may also depreciate during active duty—a phenomenon called skill atrophy—since the skills learned
in school may not necessarily be skills that are valued in the armed forces. To be fair, however, a con-
script may pick up certain skills in the armed forces that may be of use later on when they re-enter
civilian life, such as the ability to work in a hierarchical environment, which could be of value in a
ﬁrm. These positive and negative effects may even cancel each other out. It is therefore not clear
a priori whether one should expect conscripts to overperform or underperform in the civilian labor
market when compared to non-conscripts.
Inarecentpaper,Baueretal.[2009]examinethecausaleffectofconscriptiononlong-termlabor-
5market performance as measured by, among others, average daily wages. Using an identiﬁcation
strategy based on a discontinuity in the probability to be drafted, they report returns to military ser-
vice that are between 3 to 8 percent, although these values are imprecisely estimated. They therefore
conclude that the observed wage differential between conscripts and non-conscripts cannot be at-
tributedtomilitaryservice. Theirresultsarerevisitedhereusinganalternativeidentiﬁcationstrategy
based on the same data source by comparing the outcome of men and women who belong to two
different sets of birth cohorts deﬁned by the law governing conscription in Germany.6
The exogenous variation that is exploited by Bauer et al. is a discontinuity in the probability
to be drafted between different cohorts of men, which lends itself to a regression-discontinuity de-
sign [Lee and Lemieux 2010]. In the current paper, the comparison group is the sample of women
during the same time period. The provision in the German constitution (Grundgesetz) and the im-
plementing Wehrpﬂichtgesetz (the law governing conscription) only applied to men. Women were
totally excluded from military service due to the way Article 12a.4 of the Grundgesetz was worded at
that time.7 It was only in January 2001 when the law allowing women to enter the Bundeswehr and
perform combat duty on a voluntary basis was passed.8 The differing treatment of men and women
allows an alternative strategy to be employed: that of difference-in-differences to identify the causal
impact of conscription.9
The results of this paper conﬁrm the ones obtained by Bauer et al. While the point estimates
are much lower—in this case, about 0.5 percent—the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated effect is
nowhere close to conventional levels. This ﬁnding is robust to changing the sample birth cohorts,
and is also validated by additional pieces of evidence that support the maintained hypothesis of
the identiﬁcation strategy. Therefore, the deﬁnitive conclusion—based on the current paper and
on Bauer et al.—is that CMS had no impact on the labor-market performance of conscripts.
6The second aim and contribution of this paper is therefore a comparison of results obtained from alternative iden-
tiﬁcation strategies. The value of replication in the social sciences is perhaps only recently being rightfully appreciated.
However, as early as 1969, the American psychologist Donald T. Campbell already noted the importance of replication
in social science. In his words, “Because we social scientists have less ability to achieve ‘experimental isolation’, because
we have good reason to expect our treatment effects to interact signiﬁcantly with a wide variety of social factors many of
which we have not yet mapped, we have much greater needs for replication experiments than do the physical sciences.”
[Campbell 1969]
7In part, Article 12a.4 used to read “Under no circumstances may [women] render service involving the use of arms.”
8This was due to a decision of the European Court of Justice: Case C-285/98, Tanja Kreil vs. Germany, [2000] ECR I-
69. The Court ruled that Council Directive 76/207/EEC of February 9, 1967 (Equal Treatment Directive) meant that the
military profession—including posts that involve the use of arms—had to be accessible to women as well. This resulted in
an amendment to the Grundgesetz to comply with the ruling. The amended part of Article 12a.4 now reads “[Women] may
under no circumstances be required to bear weapons.” Compulsory military service, however, is still restricted to men.
9See Imbens and Wooldridge [2009] for an overview of modern microeconometric evaluation techniques.
62 Related studies on compulsory military service
In the realm of economics, comparisons between a well-regulated standing army and a “militia”
(formed by conscripts) go as far back as Adam Smith [1776] in The Wealth of Nations. Smith was
of the opinion that national defense was better left to a professional army. In Book V, Chap. I, Part I,
he says, “A militia, however, in whatever manner it may be either disciplined or exercised, must al-
waysbemuchinferiortoawell-disciplinedandwell-exercisedstandingarmy.”10 Morerecently,other
researchers have taken up the task of identifying the effects of conscription on the conscripts them-
selves.
This endeavor is not without difﬁculties. The identiﬁcation of the causal effect of conscription
or military service in general is confounded by a number of factors that are outside the control of
the investigator. For example, a regression of some labor-market outcome, say, wages on an indica-
tor of having performed CMS will hardly say much about the effect of conscription other than the
magnitude of the correlation between wages and military service. The reason is that selection into
the armed forces involves tests that measure a potential conscript’s capacity to perform well in the
military. Typically, these tests are based on health and mental acuity, and the results of these tests
are also often unavailable to the researcher. The problem of course is that health and intelligence are
precisely those factors, among others, that simultaneously determine wages and the probability of
conscription. Without being able to directly control for such inﬂuences, the estimated parameter in
the basic regression model will necessarily be biased, and will be of little use for policy.
Various strategies have been employed by applied economists to overcome the identiﬁcation
problem described above. These strategies can be broadly categorized into three econometric eval-
uation approaches: (i) instrumental-variable strategies, (ii) regression-discontinuity designs, and
(iii) difference-in-differences models. The approaches correspondingly identify three different types
of treatment effects. They are, respectively, a local average treatment effect [Imbens and Angrist
1994], a local average treatment effect valid for observations that are arbitrarily close to the point of
discontinuity [Hahn, Todd and van der Klaauw 2001], and the average treatment effect on the treated
[Ashenfelter and Card 1985; Abadie 2005]. Heckman and Vytlacil [2005] have shown that these treat-
ment effects are all versions of what they call the “marginal treatment effect”; the difference depends
only over which subpopulation the marginal treatment effect is averaged. The extent to which these
10Smith, Adam. An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. Edwin Cannan, ed. 1904. Library of
Economics and Liberty. Accessed 13 August 2010. http://www.econlib.org/library/Smith/smWN20.html.
7various treatment effects can be credibly recovered crucially depends on the institutional framework
in which the approach is applied.
In a series of related papers [1990; 1993; 1994; 2008; 2009], Angrist and his co-authors exploit the
draft lottery in the US to study the effects of military service on World War II and Vietnam War vet-
erans. The outcomes of interest are labor-market performance, health, and educational attainment.
Since the probability of being drafted was randomly allocated through a lottery system, the authors
could isolate the impact of military service on a variety of outcomes using the assigned lottery num-
ber as an instrument for actually performing military service. Imbens and van der Klaauw [1995]
and Bauer et al. [2009] use the variation in the probability to be drafted for CMS per cohort in the
Netherlands and Germany, respectively, as an instrument for being drafted for CMS.
As mentioned in the introduction, Bauer et al. employ the regression-discontinuity design in
their paper (apart from the aforementioned instrumental-variable strategy). Other studies using the
same approach include Grenet, Hart and Roberts [2010] and Buonanno [2006] for the UK. In these
papers, cohorts of men facing different probabilities to be drafted for CMS are compared against
each other to identify the effect of conscription. In its fuzzy (as opposed to a sharp) design, exploit-
ing discontinuities in the conditional probability can be interpreted as using an instrument. That is,
a variable indicating on which side of the threshold an observation is can be used as a binary instru-
ment for a variable indicating treatment status. The interpretation of the estimated treatment effect
is therefore similar to those obtained using the instrumental-variables approach, with the added
caveat that the estimate is only valid for observations close to the cutoff point (although, for an alter-
native interpretation, see Lee and Lemieux [2010]).
In terms of methodology, this paper is closest to Card and Lemieux [2001], Maurin and Xenogiani
[2007], and Cipollone and Rosolia [2007], all of whom exploit the fact that conscription only affected
men and not women. In these studies, the authors examine the relationship between conscription
of men and the demand for education in the US, France, and Italy, respectively. Card and Lemieux
and Maurin and Xenogiani particularly use difference-in-differences models to identify the impact
of conscription on educational attainment while Cipollone and Rosolia use the difference between
men and women as an instrument to identify peer effects.
83 Institutional setting and data
3.1 Women in the German armed forces
The Bundeswehr was created in response to the admissionof WestGermany into NATO. The law gov-
erning conscription was enacted by the parliament in July 1956.11 All able-bodied men born after
June 30, 1937 were required to serve in the Bundeswehr (although several exemptions were also ap-




basic training or Allgemeine Grundausbildung followed by six months posted at a military barracks)
although a proposal to shorten it further to six months was just recently implemented.
In Germany, women were only recently allowed to enter the Bundeswehr for combat duty. This
was due to an amendment to the Grundgesetz brought about by a decision of the European Court of
Justice. In Kreil vs. Germany, the Court held that the Equal Treatment Directive precluded the appli-
cation of laws, such as what was originally written in the Grundgesetz, which proscribed the employ-
ment of women in military positions involving the use of arms.13 Currently, there are 17,388 female
soldiers serving in the German armed forces. However, while women were allowed to voluntarily en-
ter the Bundeswehr after Kreil, only men are compelled to undergo national service. This distinction
was afﬁrmed in Alexander Dory vs. Germany, where the Court held that European community law
“does not preclude compulsory military service being reserved to men.”14
TheexclusionofwomenfromCMSmeansthatonecancomparetheirlabor-marketperformance
to that of men’s. However, this approach remains inadequate because men and women have, in
any case, different outcomes in the labor market, i.e., the observed difference between their per-
formances is not due solely to the fact that men performed military service. One way to solve this
11Also,Article12a.1oftheGermanconstitutionorbasiclaw(GrundgesetzderBundesrepublikDeutschland)reads: “Men
who have attained the age of 18 years may be required to serve in the Armed Forces, in the Federal Border Guard, or in a
civil defense organization.”
12Ofﬁcially, conscripts during the period 1986–1988 also had to serve for 18 months but this extension was suspended.
See Federal Ministry of Defense, “History of compulsory military service”, at http://www.bmvg.de/.
13See Footnote 8. In fact, this applied not just to the Bundeswehr but to the whole public sector as well.
14European Court of Justice, Case C-186/01, Alexander Dory vs. Germany, [2001] ECR I-2479. The extremely ﬁne dis-
tinction, according to the Court, is as follows: “decisions of the Member States concerning the organization of their armed
forces cannot be completely excluded from the application of Community law” (reiterating Kreil) but “it does not follow
that Community law governs the Member States’ choices of military organization for the defense of their territory or of
their essential interests.” [Dory, para. 35]
9problem is to exploit yet another difference in outcomes due to a policy that was randomly as-
signed among men. Luckily, one such policy is the Wehrpﬂichtgesetz, whereby only men born after
June 30, 1937 are required to undergo national service. Those born on or before—unofﬁcially called
the weißer Jahrgang or the White Cohort (presumably because they were not tainted by violence)—
were totally exempted from national service. These two differences form the basis of the two-group
mean-comparison tests that underlie the regression framework described further in Section 4.2.
3.2 Data description
The dataset used for the following analysis is constructed by merging data provided by the Institute
for Employment Research (IAB) and supplemental information provided by state pension author-
ities. The information is available for a 1-percent random sample of the total German population
that was gainfully employed and covered by social security for at least one day during the period
1975–1995.15 For these people, the entire employment history can be recovered.
Forpurposesofestimation,thefollowingwereexcludedfromthedataset: EastGermans,persons
who lived outside West Germany at any point, persons born outside the period 1932–1942, profes-
sional soldiers, as well as men who performed national service for more than 12 months. It should
be noted that, while nowadays, the majority of men performing national service do so in the form of
civilian service (Zivildienst), most men covered by the period of analysis for this study were engaged
in military service. The ﬁnal sample consists of 57,494 unique individuals, of which 33,138 or about
58 percent are men. There are 24,407 individuals born before July 1, 1937, of which 14,424 are men.
Average cohort characteristics are presented in Table 1. One can see that the average real daily
wage is following an upward trend: the 1932 cohort started with 105 DM (e53.69) while those born
ten years after in 1942 were earning 112 DM (e57.26) on a daily basis, which is about a 7 percent
increase. Education also seems to have become more important for these cohorts over time. In
particular, both shares of people with an Abitur and a degree from an institution of higher learning
(Universtität or Hochschule) have doubled in the span of a decade.16 Also worth noting is the fact
15The dataset is brieﬂy described here. For a more detailed account, see Bauer et al. [2009] and Bender, Haas and
Klose [2000]. A new version of the IAB-S will be available for researchers via the Research Data Center of the German
Employment Agency in the Institute for Employment Research (RDC–IAB) in 2011. See http://fdz.iab.de/en/FDZ_
Projects/BASID.aspx/.
16Passing the Abitur is the most common way for students to enter the university system. The certiﬁcate one obtains
after passing the Abitur is thus functionally equivalent to a school-leaving certiﬁcate which enables students to pursue
further education in the form of university training. Those who have been coded as having obtained a university degree
means that they have completed tertiary education.
10that the number of women in the sample is consistently less than men, both in total and by cohort.
RecallthatthesampleisconstructedfromthepopulationofGermanswhowereemployedforatleast
one day during the period of analysis. While the labor-force participation of women in Germany has










1932 3,609 0.04 0.03 104.80 [39.50] 1,381 2,228
1933 3,616 0.04 0.03 103.83 [39.99] 1,447 2,169
1934 4,509 0.04 0.03 105.05 [40.47] 1,842 2,667
1935 4,808 0.04 0.03 103.74 [40.73] 2,061 2,747
1936 5,023 0.05 0.04 105.46 [40.40] 2,048 2,975
1937 5,393 0.05 0.04 105.35 [40.93] 2,281 3,112
1938 5,819 0.06 0.05 105.03 [40.63] 2,461 3,358
1939 6,287 0.05 0.04 105.47 [41.06] 2,737 3,550
1940 6,747 0.06 0.05 107.60 [41.41] 2,972 3,775
1941 6,412 0.07 0.05 110.22 [42.96] 2,838 3,574
1942 5,271 0.08 0.06 112.49 [43.25] 2,288 2,983
NOTES.—Bracketed numbers are standard deviations. The variables pertaining to edu-
cational attainment are indicator variables and therefore the values presented should
be interpreted as shares in decimal form. The average daily wage is quoted in 1995 DM.
SOURCE.—Author’s calculation based on IAB-S 1975–1995.
Figures 1(a), 1(b), and 1(c) show the evolution of the average daily wage for females, for males,
and for everyone in the dataset, respectively.17 While initial wages vary depending on the birth
cohort, it is quite obvious that irrespective of one’s sex, daily wages tend to follow a positive trend
over the lifecycle. This observation is comparable to other studies that look at cohort-speciﬁc labor-
market performance over the lifecycle (e.g., Bachmann, Bauer and David [2010] and the references
citedtherein). Theaveragedailywagespercohortoffemaleshaveincreasedovertime,ascanbeseen
clearly from Figure 1(a), where the dashed line for the cohort of women born in 1942 strictly domi-
nates the equivalent lines for the other two cohorts. This can probably be attributed to the gradual
institutionalchangesinGermansocietythatdeﬁnetheroleofwomenandhowtheycanproductively
participate in society.
However, one can also see in Figures 1(a) and 1(b) that women still earn signiﬁcantly less than
17Only the cohorts 1932, 1937, and 1942 are drawn for aesthetic reasons. The other cohorts follow a similar trend of
rising average daily wage over their careers. The complete graphs can be made available upon request although it will be
difﬁcult to distinguish one cohort from the others as the lines overlap substantially. Note also the difference in scales in the
ordinates.
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1963 1968 1973 1978 1983 1988
Year
Cohort 1932 Cohort 1937
Cohort 1942
(c) All
NOTES.—For clarity, only the cohorts 1932, 1937, and 1942 are presented here. Similar trends can be observed for the
remaining cohorts.
SOURCE.—Author’s own illustration based on the IAB-S 1975–1995.
12men. At 46 years old, the average woman born in 1942 was earning a little over 100 DM (e51.13).
Her male counterpart was already earning roughly the same amount in his late 20s. An alternative
way to represent this is shown by Figure 2, where the difference in lifetime average daily wages18 be-
tween men and women is clearly seen. The points on the graph represent the mean lifetime average
daily wage computed for each month–year cohort and separately for each sex. For those born before
July 1, 1937, the difference remained constant at about 50 DM (e25.56). While both groups show an
increasing lifetime average daily wage by cohort—consistent with what has already been shown in
Figure 1—the evolution of this measure of labor-market performance seems to have accelerated for
men as indicated by the slightly steeper line segment for cohorts born after the threshold date.
FIGURE 2




















































7/32 7/33 7/34 7/35 7/36 7/37 7/38 7/39 7/40 7/41 7/42
Month and year of birth
Male Female
NOTES.—The points on the graph represent the mean lifetime average daily wage by month–year cohort and sex. Dashed
lines are lowess curves estimated separately for each sex.
SOURCE.—Author’s own illustration based on the IAB-S 1975–1995.
Figure 3 show the probability of being drafted by month of birth for males. The points on the
graph represent the share of men who were drafted for each month–year cohort. For the White Co-
hort and for women, conscription was unnecessary and therefore the probability to be drafted was
zero. Whilethiswasthecaseforbothmenandwomenbornbeforethethresholddate,menbornafter
June 30, 1937 exhibitedan increasingprobability to be drafted for military service. Infact, those born
in 1942 were facing a conscription probability of roughly 40 percent, most likely due to the demands
oftheColdWar. Therelatively lowconscriptionratesfor thebirthcohorts1937–1939 (betweenabout
18Lifetime average daily wage is computed as the cumulative real earnings from 1963 to 1988 divided by the total days
of employment.
1310–20 percent) is due to the special exemptions accorded to certain men. These were especially rele-
vant at the time the law on conscription took effect. For example, sole sons of soldiers killed in World
War II or those who lost all their siblings qualiﬁed for such an exemption.
FIGURE 3



































7/32 7/33 7/34 7/35 7/36 7/37 7/38 7/39 7/40 7/41 7/42
Month and year of birth
NOTES.—The points on the graph represent the share of men who were drafted by month–year cohort. Dashed lines
represent the quadratic ﬁt estimated separately for both sides of the threshold.
SOURCE.—Author’s own illustration based on the IAB-S 1975–1995.
4 Estimation strategy and results
4.1 Descriptive regressions
The ﬁgures and tables discussed in Section 3.2 can also be represented in a regression framework.
For this purporse, one could regress the (log) average daily wage, lnwi, against indicator variables
for a person’s birth cohort and sex. More speciﬁcally, consider the following regression model, where
i =1,2,...,N indexes individuals:
lnwi =α+δmi +λ ci + i,( 1 )
where mi is a dichotomous variable that equals 1 if the individual is male, ci is a vector of variables
indicating a person’s birth cohort (i.e., cohort ﬁxed effects), and  i is a typical stochastic disturbance
term; α, δ,a n dλ are parameters or vectors of parameters to be estimated.
The regression estimates based on Equation (1) are presented in Table 2, speciﬁcally Column (2).
14For the sake of completeness, Equation (1) is supplemented with additional covariates that control
for a person’s level of educational attainment. This is shown in Column (3) while Column (1) is a
parsimonious regression of the (log) average daily wage rate only on cohort indicator variables and
a constant. The regressions conﬁrm what can already be gleaned from the ﬁgures and tables. That
is, (i) later birth cohorts and (ii) men exhibit a higher average daily wage. Moreover, one learns that,
as expected, there are signiﬁcant returns to completing an apprenticeship, having an Abitur (com-
pleting secondary education), and obtaining a university degree. These translate to a wage premium
of about 19, 30, and 39 percent, respectively, where the reference category is having no secondary-
education degree or its equivalent.
Restricting the sample only to men makes it worthwhile to estimate the following variant of the
regression model:
lnwi =α+γdi +ρni + i, (2)
where di is a binary variable that equals 1 if the man performed CMS and ni is an indicator that
equals 1 if the individual does not belong to the White Cohort; γ and ρ are additional parameters
to be estimated. Using Equation (2), one obtains the following estimates:  α = 4.559,  γ = 0.351, and
 ρ =− 0.019, with associated standard errors of 0.003, 0.004, and 0.004, respectively. Taken at face
value, conscription is associated with a 35-percent wage premium.
The estimate of γ above is certainly too high for it to be interpreted as the causal effect of con-
scription; it is higher than the estimated returns to secondary education. However, this is also not
surprising, considering that none of the possible biases have been taken into account simply by us-
ing Equation (2). For instance, selection into the Bundeswehr involves a physical and mental exami-
nation. Those who fail such a test—and therefore, to more likely perform worse in the labor market
later on—are exempted from conscription. Conversely, those who pass (i.e., those who are healthier
and mentally superior) are more likely to excel anyway in the labor market compared to their peers.
Inotherwords,totheextentthatbothintelligenceandhealthhaveapositiveimpactonlabor-market
performance, men who performed CMS can reasonably be expected to have earned higher wages—
but, importantly, not necessarily because of conscription.
15TABLE 2
DESCRIPTIVE REGRESSIONS OF (LOG) AVERAGE DAILY WAGE
Variables (1) (2) (3)
1933 −0.012 −0.003 −0.007
[0.010] [0.008] [0.008]
1934 −0.001 0.015* 0.007
[0.010] [0.008] [0.008]
1935 −0.017* 0.010 −0.001
[0.010] [0.008] [0.008]
1936 0.004 0.018** 0.005
[0.010] [0.008] [0.007]
1937 0.001 0.024*** 0.007
[0.010] [0.008] [0.007]
1938 −0.002 0.022*** −0.003
[0.010] [0.008] [0.007]
1939 0.002 0.033*** 0.010
[0.010] [0.007] [0.007]
1940 0.024*** 0.058*** 0.033***
[0.009] [0.007] [0.007]
1941 0.046*** 0.081*** 0.049***
[0.010] [0.007] [0.007]
1942 0.068*** 0.098*** 0.061***
[0.010] [0.008] [0.007]
Male — 0.582*** 0.536***
[0.003] [0.003]
Apprenticeship — — 0.193***
[0.003]
Abitur — — 0.297***
[0.017]
University — — 0.085***
[0.018]
Constant 4.563*** 4.204*** 4.113***
[0.008] [0.006] [0.006]
R2 0.0029 0.3924 0.4417
F-statistic 16.64 2,942.06 2,973.23
Observations 57,494 57,494 57,494
NOTES.—The results are based on OLS regressions of the
(log) average daily wage against a set of covariates as des-
cribed in Equation (1). Columns (1), (2), and (3) differ on-
ly in the covariates. The reference cohort, sex, and edu-
cational attainment are 1932, female, and no secondary-
education degree, respectively. Bracketed numbers are
heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. * p <0.10,
** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
SOURCE.—Author’s calculation based on IAB-S 1975–
1995.
164.2 Identiﬁcation of the effect of conscription
Torecovertheimpactofconscriptiononagenericoutcomevariable yi,onecouldexecuteastandard
difference-in-differences (DD) model of the following form:
yi =α+δmi +θni +τ(mi ×ni)+ i. (3)
The parameters or vector of parameters α, δ, θ,a n dτ are then typically estimated via ordinary least
squares. Denote (mi ×ni) as the DD regressor; the estimated parameter  τ represents the treatment
effect. The maintained hypothesis here is that the difference in yi between men and women would
have remained the same in the absence of the treatment.19
ThemainadvantageofEquation(3)overEquations(1)and(2)isthattheformermodeleliminates
any time-invariant unobserved differences between the two sexes, and consequently, any biases that
may arise out of such unobservables. One could go one step further and account for the observed
compositional differences between males and females by augmenting Equation (3) with additional
covariates:
yi =α+δmi +θni +τ(mi ×ni)+β xi + i, (4)
where xi is a vector of control variables and its coefﬁcient β is a vector of parameters to be estimated.
In the conditional DD representation of Equation (4), the impact of CMS is corrected for the inﬂu-
ence of time-varying observable individual characteristics, albeit in a linear fashion. Moreover, the
additionofcovariatesshouldimprovetheprecisionoftheestimatesintermsoflowerstandarderrors
[Galiani, Gertler and Schargrodsky 2005].
The results of the DD estimation, where yi is the (log) average daily wage as in Section 4.1, are
presentedinTable3. DDestimateswithyearﬁxedeffects—necessitatingthedeletionofθni fromthe
model—are also presented. That is, the following models are estimated, where Equation (6) merely
19An alternative identiﬁcation strategy is that employed in Bauer et al. [2009], where the regression-discontinuity de-
sign of military service in Germany is exploited. Using men born around the threshold date of date of June 30, 1937, the
assumption is that men born on either side of the cutoff are different only in that the non-White Cohort had a positive
probability of being drafted.
17corrects for additional covariates:
lnwi =α+δmi +τ(mi ×ni)+λ ci + i (5)
lnwi =α+δmi +τ(mi ×ni)+λ ci +β xi + i, (6)
where λ is a parameter vector to be estimated. The results are in Columns (3) and (4) of Table 3,
respectively. Regressions based on Equations (3) and (4) are presented in Columns (1) and (2), re-
spectively. The covariates included in the vector xi are the following: (i) indicator variables for the
quarter of birth, where the ﬁrst quarter is the reference category; and (ii) indicator variables for the
educational attainment (completed an apprenticeship, Abitur, or university), where the reference
category is having no secondary-education degree.
TABLE 3
DIFFERENCE-IN-DIFFERENCES ESTIMATES OF THE TREATMENT EFFECT
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
DD regressor −0.001 0.007 −0.001 0.005
[0.007] [0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Male 0.582*** 0.531*** 0.583*** 0.533***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
Non-White Cohort 0.045 0.021*** — —
[0.006] [0.006]
Apprenticeship — 0.194*** — 0.193***
[0.003] [0.003]
Abitur — 0.299*** — 0.298***
[0.017] [0.017]
University — 0.087*** — 0.085***
[0.018] [0.018]
Constant 4.215*** 4.119*** 4.203*** 4.115***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.007] [0.007]
Cohort ﬁxed effects None None All All
Quarter of birth None All None All
R2 0.3901 0.4403 0.3924 0.4418
F-statistic 11,217.83 4,780.17 2,848.36 2,412.83
Observations 57,494 57,494 57,494 57,494
NOTES.—Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) correspond to Equations (3), (4), (5),
and (6), respectively. Bracketed numbers are heteroskedasticity-robust stan-
dard errors clustered at the date of birth. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
SOURCE.—Author’s calculation based on IAB-S 1975–1995.
Across all speciﬁcations, one cannot reject the null hypothesis that the treatment effect is equal
to zero. That is, there is no signiﬁcant effect of conscription on the average daily wages of the cohort
ofmenbornonorafterJuly1, 1937. Takethemost-preferredestimatepresentedinColumn(4)based
on Equation (6). Here,  τ is equal to 0.005, which is much less than the naive estimate  γ = 0.351 ob-
18tained from Equation (2). The DD estimates in Table 3 are much more reasonable compared to the
estimates that ignore the selection into treatment. This highlights—in a rather extreme way, consid-
ering that  τ is less than 2 percent of  γ—the importance of correcting for selection bias introduced by
the institutional arrangements surrounding the induction of conscripts into the Bundeswehr.
Nevertheless, all the other estimated coefﬁcients presented in Table 3 are signiﬁcant at the 1-
percent level (except the cohort indicator in Column (1)) and are of reasonable magnitudes. For
example, one can see that there are positive returns to education, which are similar to the estimates
presented in Table 2. This is also the case for the estimate of the wage gap between men and women
which, in Column (4), is about 53 percent (and consistent with the reported wage gap at that time;
see, e.g., Maier [2007]). Correcting for the time-invariant unobservables that simultaneously affect
the probability of serving in the Bundeswehr and future labor-market performance, such as innate
health and intelligence, seems to have affected only the estimates of the treatment effect (i.e.,  τ and
 γ, although the latter is obviously biased).
The parameter of interest, τ, is typically interpreted in DD models as the average treatment effect
on the treated (ATET) because it is the coefﬁcient of the indicator variable formed by interacting a
treatment indicator with an indicator identifying the treatment period (before or after). Here, how-
ever, the variable ni only identiﬁes whether one was born before the threshold date of June 30, 1937,
not whether or not one served in the Bundeswehr. In this particular context, τ is thus properly inter-
preted as the intention-to-treat effect (ITTE).
The ITTE is less than the ATET unless all men born on or after July 1, 1937 served in the Bundes-
wehr, in which case the estimates of the ITTE and the ATET would be equal to each other. More
speciﬁcally, ATET is equal to τ/(1−r), where r is the share of men who do not belong to the White
Cohort and served in the Bundeswehr. Therefore, the estimate of the ATET is directly proportional to
the compliance rate, holding the estimated ITTE constant. The number of men in the sample born
after the cutoff date is 18,714, of which 4,524 performed CMS. This implies that the compliance rate
is about 24 percent. Using the aforementioned equality, the recovered ATET of conscription is thus
0.006.
While the deﬁnitions of and relationship between the ATET and ITTE are somewhat mechanical,
theirinterpretationsarenot. Thiscruciallydependsonthequestionthatisposed, i.e.,inwhicheffect
one is principally interested. If one is concerned with the effect of the introduction of CMS, then τ
19can be directly construed as the ATET. If the interest lies instead with the effect of conscription itself
and not merely its introduction, then τ can only properly be interpreted as the ITTE.
The set of point estimates in the current instance is much lower than what was previously ob-
tained in Bauer et al. [2009], although both are statistically insigniﬁcant. This is likely due to a variety
of reasons, not the least of which is the difference in comparison groups. Here, women constitute
the control group while the previous paper uses men born just before the threshold date. Moreover,
because of the instrumental-variable nature of the regression-discontinuity design, the estimate is
only valid for those men who are arbitrarily close to the threshold and, even then, only for those
whose treatment status is inﬂuenced by their date of birth. This is most certainly a subset of men for
whom the estimates in this paper are valid. Nevertheless, it remains comforting that the statistical
signiﬁcance is unchanged when alternating identiﬁcation strategies.
4.3 Further results
In order to obtain a consistent estimate of the treatment effect, it must be the case that the rela-
tive outcomes for men and women from the same birth cohort would have followed the same trend
but for a sex-speciﬁc treatment or policy change. In other words, had the Wehrpﬂichtgesetz not
been enacted into law, the difference in outcomes between men and women born in the same year
would have remained the same for those born before and after the threshold date. If this parallel- or
common-trends assumption is not likely to hold, the parameter estimate is unfortunately rendered
inconsistent.
Thisisanassumptionaboutthecounterfactualandthereforecannotbestatisticallytested. How-
ever, there are strong indications that the evolution of average daily wages for both men and women
would have followed the same trend if obligatory military service were not introduced in Germany.
Figure 2 already indicates that average daily wages were exhibiting the same pattern for men and
women born before the cutoff date. Evidence from this visual inspection can at least be statistically
veriﬁed. The idea is that, if the average daily wages for the two sexes were following the same trend
before the policy intervention, it is much more likely that they would have continued to develop
similarly in the absence of such an intervention.
Tothisend,onecoulddropallindividualsbornafterthethresholddate. Then,onecouldperform
a regression based on Equation (5) but with an altered deﬁnition of ni to simulate a policy change
20in July 1933. If there were no sex-speciﬁc treatment at that time, the estimate of the coefﬁcient of
the DD regressor should be insigniﬁcant. These “placebo regressions” could be performed for each
subsequent year until 1936. The results of such regressions are presented in Table 4. None of the
simulatedpolicychangeswerefoundtohaveasigniﬁcantimpactonaveragedailywages. Thismeans
that before the actual implementation of the Wehrpﬂichtgesetz, the relative labor-market outcomes
for men and women (in terms of average daily wages, at least) were not on divergent paths.
TABLE 4
PLACEBO REGRESSIONS BASED ON SIMULATED POLICY CHANGES
Variables 1933 1934 1935 1936
Placebo −0.001 0.000 0.006 −0.011
[0.010] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009]
Male 0.583*** 0.583*** 0.580*** 0.585***
[0.009] [0.007] [0.006] [0.005]
Constant 4.203*** 4.203*** 4.205*** 4.202***
[0.010] [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]
Cohort ﬁxed effects All All All All
R2 0.3869 0.3869 0.3869 0.3869
F-statistic 1,883.69 1,883.77 1,885.32 1,884.68
Observations 24,407 24,407 24,407 24,407
NOTES.—Placebo regressions are based on Equation (3). Policy changes
were simulated for the years 1933, 1934, 1935, and 1936. Only individuals
born before July 1, 1937 are included in the regressions. * p <0.10,
** p <0.05, *** p <0.01.
SOURCE.—Author’s calculation based on IAB-S 1975–1995.
Nevertheless, one should not discount the fact that the role of women in society was also gradu-
ally changing during that time. Not only were wages steadily increasing (although still far below their
male counterparts), labor-force participation was also evolving and, concomitantly, so was fertil-
ity [Bredtmann, Kluve and Schaffner 2009; Jaumotte 2003]. If performing Wehrdienst had a positive
impact on men’s labor-market performance, but women’s labor-market performance was improv-
ing more rapidly than men’s, the DD approach would underestimate the impact of conscription. Of
course, men’s participation rate might also have been changing towards the opposite direction (see,
for example, Fitzenberger, Schnabel and Wunderlich [2004]). These developments in the labor mar-
ket suggest that one should be cautious in using women as a comparison group for men since these
sex-speciﬁc developments may be driving the result.
Although the placebo regressions have already established that the difference in outcomes be-
tween men and women remained relatively stable over the pre-treatment period, one could alleviate
any residual concerns by taking yet another approach to address this issue. Hence, the sample is
21reﬁned by trimming both sides of the cohort spectrum, incrementally reducing the sample size and
running the same regressions that generated Table 3. The rationale behind this approach is that
changes in women’s labor-force participation and fertility are gradual developments brought about
by changes in society’s institutions and mores, which themselves normally transform at a glacial
pace. By narrowing the period of analysis from the original 1932–1942 to incrementally shorter peri-
ods in between, the bias introduced by such developments will unlikely materialize.
Furthermore, it has been shown that DD estimates over long sample periods can seriously suffer
from underestimated standard errors [Bertrand, Duﬂo and Mullainathan 2004]. This is due to the
serial correlation in the error terms, which, when unaccounted for, translates to rejections of the null
hypothesis of no effect that occur more often than it correctly should. In this study, unobservables
may persist over time, affecting adjacent cohorts similarly. The error term can thus reasonably be
expected to be correlated over cohorts. A proposed solution is to collapse the period of analysis
into just two periods: one before and one after the policy intervention. This limits the scope of the
problem due to serial correlation. Narrowing the sample band described above therefore addresses
this issue as well.
Regression results based on a strategy of trimming the sample are presented in Table 5. The
estimated coefﬁcients remain relatively stable across all speciﬁcations, i.e., close to zero. These are
comparable to the previously estimated coefﬁcients based on the full sample presented in Table 3.
Of course, the reduction in the sample size consequently leads to higher standard errors but the
increase is not dramatic. One could thus be conﬁdent with the estimated treatment effects. The
ITTE of 0.005 from Column (4) of Table 3 and its implied ATET of 0.006 fall roughly in the middle of
the range of estimates presented both in Tables 3 and 5. These pieces of evidence lend credibility to
the appropriateness of the identiﬁcation strategy employed in this study.
Finally, heterogeneous treatment effects are examined by estimating the DD model using only
individuals without a secondary-education degree. This group is special because they represent the
low-skilled segment of the labor force. Absent the training provided by formal educational institu-
tions, the Bundeswehr may act as a substitute by instilling discipline and perhaps certain other skills
that might be relevant for the civilian labor market later on. The results of these regressions are pre-



























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































IMPACT OF CONSCRIPTION ON LOW-SKILLED INDIVIDUALS
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
DD regressor −0.009 −0.009 −0.011 −0.012
[0.010] [0.010] [0.009] [0.009]
Male 0.542*** 0.542*** 0.544*** 0.543***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.013] [0.007]
Non-White Cohort 0.033 0.033*** — —
[0.008] [0.008]
Constant 4.110*** 4.113*** 4.110*** 4.113***
[0.006] [0.007] [0.011] [0.011]
Cohort ﬁxed effects None None All All
Quarter of birth None All None All
R2 0.3510 0.3511 0.3525 0.3527
F-statistic 3,920.80 1,962.47 990.75 793.39
Observations 19,361 19,361 19,361 19,361
NOTES.—Columns (1), (2), (3), and (4) correspond to Equations (3), (4), (5),
and (6), respectively. Only individuals with no secondary-education degree
are included in the regression. Bracketed numbers are heteroskedasticity-
robust standard errors clustered at the date of birth. * p <0.10, ** p <0.05,
*** p <0.01.
SOURCE.—Author’s calculation based on IAB-S 1975–1995.
5 Conclusion
This paper revisits compulsory military service in two senses. First, it looks back at the labor-market
performance of men who underwent conscription when it was introduced in Germany during the
second half of the 20th century. Second, it reexamines the results ﬁrst reported by Bauer et al. [2009]
by subjecting the data to an alternative but equally plausible identiﬁcation strategy. The natural
experiment here is anchored on a combination of laws which exempted women and a particular
cohort of men called the weißer Jahrgang from military service.
Difference-in-differences estimates are computed by comparing the average daily wages of men
and women born before and after the date of birth on which conscription was enforced. The point
estimateofthesemi-elasticityoftheaveragedailywageis0.5percentbutwithanassociatedstandard
error of 0.6. The results therefore indicate that conscription had no signiﬁcant impact on the labor-
market performance of draftees in terms of the average daily wage. This is consistent with the results
found in Bauer et al. and Grenet, Hart and Roberts [2010]. Both studies ﬁnd that conscripts were
neither penalized nor rewarded in the civilian labor market.
Current policy discussions in Germany involve serious proposals to abandon conscription alto-
gether or to at least substantially change the way the armed forces are staffed and organized. This
24paper adds to that discussion by highlighting the effect of conscription on precisely those men that
have been drafted to serve their country once before. Thus, while the paper reﬂects on the past to
comprehend the present, it is also forward-looking in that it contributes to policy conclusions that
shape Germany’s future national defense strategy.
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